I. Introduction
Detecting sensor faults is of paramount importance in autonomous systems, as a faulty sensor could lead state estimates to diverge and induce system failures. A common method of fault detection is the simple use and comparison of physically redundant sensors. This type of setup is simple but requires a minimum of two sensors to detect faults and a minimum of three sensors to isolate the faulty sensor.
1 Small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), however, are unable to carry redundant sensors due to size, weight, and power (SWAP) constraints. This precludes the use of physical redundancy for fault detection, which has been employed successfully on platforms not subject to stringent SWAP constraints.
The fault detection and accommodation problem has received a great deal of attention in the literature. Numerous approaches have been developed that attempt to establish analytical redundancy 2 to compensate for a lack of hardware redundancy. According to a series of recent survey papers, 2-4 the methods employed fit into three different categories: quantitative model-based methods, qualitative model-based methods, and process history-based methods.
Quantitative model-based methods use mathematical expressions to model a system. Differences between the expected and actual system behavior are then used as fault indicators. Examples of strategies that fall into this category are parity equation approaches, 5 Kalman filter based approaches, 6, 7 and parameter estimation techniques, 8 which all require accurate models of the system. Qualitative model-based methods are developed based on some fundamental understanding of the process. Order of magnitude comparisons and similar qualitative comparisons of expected and actual system output are used to determine whether the system is functioning properly. Examples of strategies that fall into this category include digraphs 9 and qualitative physics methods, 10 which require only qualitative models. In contrast to both of the model-based methods, process history-based methods do not require a priori knowledge about the system; they instead require a large amount of historical data. This data is then transformed into a priori knowledge through a feature extraction process. Examples of this type of strategy include statistical feature extraction 11 and principle component analysis/partial least squares. 12 The examples given here are just a few of the numerous fault detection methods in existence.
A Kalman filter based fault detection approach has been employed for this research, based primarily on the method detailed in [6] . This type of method is fairly simple to understand and implement. In addition, many autonomous vehicles already employ some form of Kalman filter for estimation. Thus, this method adds very little computational overhead, an important consideration for implementation on small UAVs.
The proposed fault detection scheme is tested on a scenario involving an autonomous rotorcraft. As noted in [13] and [14] , rotorcraft are inherently unstable and have fast dynamics, making them an ideal target for a robust fault detection method. Their work, like ours, employs model-based methods of fault detection. However, the method we propose differs from this other work in a few important ways. First, the work in [13] employs a Luenberger observer, which is deterministic, rather than a stochastic Kalman filter. This will result in decreased robustness of the algorithm. They also assume that a fault is present the first time a residual exceeds a threshold, which can lead to higher false alarm rates. The approach outlined in [14] uses a linear model for fault detection as opposed to the more accurate nonlinear model we propose for our fault detection approach. In addition, while the researchers note that their experimental results were obtained using real flight data, no indication is given that fault detection could be performed in real time. We will show that our approach is capable of real-time on-board implementation, a result we have not found in the literature.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II explains the fault detection algorithm we have employed. In Section III, the test scenario used to evaluate the fault detection algorithm is described. Section IV describes the estimator that was used in the hardware tests. Details of the real-time implementation of the fault detection algorithm are provided in Section V, along with the results of these tests. Finally, Section VI contains conclusions and suggestions for future work.
II. Fault Detection
The main purpose of the fault detection algorithm is to produce warnings of sensor failure or degradation for non-redundant sensors. An autonomous vehicle can then make informed decisions about whether or not to trust the data coming from those sensors.
The method begins with the computation of the innovation
where h is the measurement from the sensor of interest andĥ is the predicted measurement generated by the model. The residual is computed during the measurement update step of the Kalman filter. The residual is then linearized for computation of the covariance of the innovation term, given by
where H is the Jacobian of the residual with respect to the state of the system and R represents the uncertainty of a given sensor. The innovation is then normalized by computing
where i denotes the measurement index. An important note is that when the filter accurately predicts the state of the system and the sensor is functioning properly, the sequence of normalized innovation terms is a zero-mean Gaussian white noise process with covariance I. We will assume that our system model is sufficiently accurate as to produce such an innovation sequence in the absence of sensor faults. Thus, faults in the system are recognized by deviations of the innovation sequence from its zero-mean, unit covariance, white noise properties. Significance of any deviations from these nominal properties can be assessed through hypothesis testing. Following the work of [6] , hypothesis tests on both the mean and the covariance of the innovation sequence are used to detect faults. This is done locally using a small sliding window to promote fast detection and to reduce memory requirements. A measurement that causes either test to fail is flagged as a faulty measurement. These tests are then followed by a simple thresholding test, as shown in Figure 1 . Details of the tests are given below. 
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II.A. Test of Mean
The test of mean is designed to determine whether the mean of the normalized innovation sequence is zero with some level of significance. This is easily verified by the following hypothesis test.
To test (4), first an estimate of the sequence mean,μ, must be computed. The Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate for the mean (the sample mean) given bŷ
is used, where N is the window size chosen for the test. Using a method of multivariate analysis, 15 the test statistic
can be constructed that parallels the standard normal test for the univariate case. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic Z 2 is distributed as a χ 2 random variable with m degrees of freedom, where m is the dimension of the residual. Thus, the test of mean is given by
where α is the desired level of confidence, D 0 and D 1 represent failure to reject the null hypothesis and rejection of the null hypothesis, respectively, and Q χ 2 (k, p) is the quantile function (inverse cumulative distribution function) for a χ 2 distribution with k degrees of freedom and probability p.
II.B. Test of Covariance
As in the test of mean, the test of covariance considers the no fault case as the null hypothesis, yielding
The sample covariance, S, an unbiased estimator of the sequence covariance, is used to perform this test. According to [16] , tr(N S) has a χ 2 distribution with mν degrees of freedom, where m is the dimension of S and ν = N − 1. Thus, the test of covariance is denoted
There are a number of other tests of covariance proposed in the literature, 7, 15, 17, 18 however this method is very simple and has been shown to yield good results.
II.C. Threshold Test
The number of false alarms generated by this method is reduced through the use of a threshold test. The sensor is declared faulty only when a large percentage of the most recent measurements are declared faulty by either the test of mean or the test of covariance. This prevents the vehicle from distrusting the sensor after only a few flagged measurements. A window of size W is used for this test. Letting n represent the number of faults within the current window, we pick some threshold, T < W , such that the test
yields a decision about the health of the sensor. Here again, D 0 represents failure to declare a fault and D 1 represents the declaration of a fault. Window size for this test can be chosen independently of the window size for the tests of mean and covariance. Choosing a larger window will delay and sometimes mask legitimate fault declarations, whereas too small a window will not appreciably reduce the false alarm rate. The operator must use discretion to choose an appropriate window size and threshold for this test. These quantities will vary from system to system and should be selected in light of the considerations above.
III. Scenario
The scenario developed to test the algorithm requires the detection of faults in a laser rangefinder acting as a height-above-ground (HAG) sensor onboard an autonomous rotorcraft. Because a fault in this sensor could cause the rotorcraft to crash, it is important that faults be quickly detected and removed from the decision making process.
The rotorcraft uses a relative navigation approach to achieve accurate estimates of its state, as explained below. Other sensors available onboard the rotorcraft include an inertial measurement unit (IMU), which includes accelerometers and rate gyros for each of the three principle axes. Additionally, updates come from a visual odometry (VO) algorithm, 19 which produces measurements using a forward-looking RGB-D camera. The rotorcraft is flown in a controlled indoor environment with a level, flat ground for simplicity.
III.A. Hardware
The rotorcraft and the onboard sensor configuration are shown in Figure 2 . Details of the hardware used in our tests are given in Table 1 .
III.B. Relative Navigation Approach
In [20] and [21] , the authors propose that a vehicle should navigate using a relative formulation of the vehicle state, rather than a global one. A combination of graph SLAM and an EKF is used to provide mapping and sensor fusion. The map is a pose graph, with images from the onboard camera as key components of the nodes. The EKF provides estimates at the high rate required for feedback control of the vehicle. The difference over other approaches is that the position and yaw states of the EKF are defined with respect to the Figure 3 . Relative navigation using nodes and edges. As the vehicle flies through the environment, nodes are created using the VO keyframes and the edges are defined between them using the relative states of the MEKF. The vehicle state is relative to node four in this illustration.
The map in Figure 3 illustrates the relative topological approach. The VO algorithm initializes a keyframe at node 1 and an edge is added between the global frame and the node frame once this information is known. The filter estimates the position and yaw states of the vehicle with respect to the local coordinate frame at node 1 as the vehicle travels. When the VO requires a new keyframe to maintain good performance, a new keyframe and node are declared at pose 2. An edge is added to the map using the relative states and covariance in the EKF. The navigation then continues with respect to node 2 by marginalizing out the old relative states and augmenting the state vector with new ones. This process continues as the vehicle moves through the environment, with new keyframes and nodes being declared as necessary and the EKF changing the relative states each time a new keyframe is declared.
IV. Estimator
As indicated previously, model-based fault detection methods require accurate models to detect faults reliably. For this reason, an important part of this fault detection method has been the development of an accurate estimator. 21 We use position and yaw states that are relative to the current node in the map in this approach as explained above.
A multiplicative extended Kalman filter (MEKF) 22 is employed for the state estimation. The MEKF is an indirect EKF, which means that the error in the state ∆x is maintained in the filter rather than the best estimatex.
IV.A. State Dynamics
The states x of the rotorcraft are
The relative position vector p n is the displacement of the body with respect to the current node in the map. The quaternion q b n expresses the attitude of the body-fixed frame with respect to the node frame; it is relative to the current node in the map for yaw only. v b is the body-fixed frame velocity vector. The gyroscope biases are in the vector β. Accelerometer biases in the body x and y directions are represented by α.
The inputs to the model are the gyroscope measurements and the z-accelerometer
The nonlinear update equations for the states (11) arė
A rotation matrix R(q 
assumes that the order of the quaternion it multiplies is q x q y q z q w . The noise η ω is the zero-mean Gaussian noise in the measured gyroscopes from the inputs u. The constant matrix M is
and the constants g and µ are the gravity and rotor drag coefficient, respectively.
An improved model of the hexacopter dynamics in (15) , which accounts for the rotor drag with coefficient µ, provides the ability to fully utilize the information contained in the accelerometer measurements. 21 As a consequence, estimation accuracy improves and the requirements for view matching or any other exteroceptive measurement updates are reduced. This improvement in estimation accuracy also enhances our ability to detect faults in sensors.
IV.B. Error Dynamics
The error dynamics, with error state ∆x, are used to propagate the error covariance matrix P and are derived from the nonlinear dynamics (13) through (19) (see [21] for details).
The error dynamics can be linearized and result in a linear model
where A is the Jacobian of the error dynamics with respect to the error state ∆x and B is the Jacobian of the error dynamics with respect to the input u.
IV.C. Measurement Updates
We update the filter using laser, accelerometer, view-matching position, and view-matching orientation measurements. Each measurement update follows the same procedure, detailed in [21] . The residual and its covariance are computed as in (1) and (2). The Kalman gain L is
The correction (or updated error state) ∆x + is computed as
where the + notation denotes an updated variable. The covariance is updated usinĝ
We use the correction (23) to update the current state estimatex. A component a of the state, that is not a quaternion, is updated usingâ
The quaternions in the state are updated according tô
where
whereq vec denotes the vector portion of the quaternion, q x q y q z . Next, we illustrate the measurement update procedure for the laser.
IV.C.1. Laser Measurement Model
The laser provides a global measurement of the altitude of the vehicle, assuming flight near hover and a flat floor. We can obtain an estimate of the global altitude using the position in the current statep and the global positionp node of the current node with respect to which we are navigating. No rotational transformation is necessary as the global down and node down directions are parallel. To compute the Jacobian H las of the residual with respect to the error state, we must develop an analytical expression for the residual ∆h las = h las −ĥ las . We have
where ∆z las is the z-offset of the laser from the vehicle center of mass, and b las is a known laser bias term. Then the analytic residual is
The Jacobian H las of the residual is trivially
The covariance of the innovation is then found by (2) to be C = R las + HPH . This measurement update was coupled with the fault detection method described in Section II and was tested as described next.
V. Experimental Results
Hardware tests of the algorithm were performed to test its capabilities. As mentioned, the tests followed the HAG scenario described in Section III. To isolate the sensor of interest, other sensors were assumed to be free from faults. The estimator was run at 100 Hz, the update rate of the IMU. Measurement updates from the laser rangefinder and the visual odometry algorithm were applied at 10 Hz and 15 Hz, respectively.
Software was developed to perform these tests using the ROS (Robot Operating System) 23 framework. Testing consisted of first collecting timestamped IMU, VO, laser, and truth data from the flight computer using ROS as the hexacopter was flown autonomously in an indoor environment. To get a comprehensive view of the detection characteristics of the algorithm, sixteen datasets were collected that are representative of proper system operation, as determined by comparison of fault-free state estimates with truth data. Through the rosbag tool, this data was then played back in real time to the estimator and fault detection module, as shown in Figure 4 . Note that the laser datastream passes through a block that introduces faults into the data before reaching the estimator. The datasets were first analyzed with no faults injected. Due to uncertainty in system parameters and the tuning of laser uncertainty, it was necessary to tune the thresholds given in (7) and (9) to achieve the desired false alarm rate. The window size and threshold for the thresholding test were also tuned so the overall fault detection rate was approximately five percent. Testing yielded an average false alarm rate of 5.4%. The resulting thresholds were then used for the remaining tests.
It was determined that the algorithm should detect bias, drift, and increased sensor noise within a 20 second interval from the time of fault inception. Varied magnitudes of these faults were injected to show the severity of faults that can be reliably detected. An example of the results is shown in Figure 5 .
The detection characteristics of the algorithm were then evaluated by computing detection rate within the given window and delay to detection for each test. Detection rate is given by
where n d is the number of detections and n f is the number of faulty measurements, both within the window of interest. Delay in detection was simply calculated as Tables 2 -4 . These tables contain the detection rates for the 20 second window after fault inception and also for the entire dataset after fault inception. Comparison of these values indicates that the algorithm is very quick to detect bias, though the detection rate lessens with time. This is due to the static nature of the fault. Because the faulty data is still used to update the estimator, estimates converge to the biased state, after which the fault is no longer detected. Table 2 also indicates that bias is quickly detected in most cases. This The results for drift show an increase in detection rate and decrease in detection time as fault magnitude is increased, as expected. Unlike in the case of bias, however, the detection rate is higher when we consider detections after the prescribed 20 second window. The average values for delay to detection indicate that this is because drift takes longer to detect drift than bias. The highest magnitude drift tested represents a change of 0.5% of maximum sensor range per second, also indicating good detection.
The test for increased sensor noise also showed an increase in detection rate and a decrease in detection time as fault magnitude increased. Because of the abrupt nature of noisy measurements, the detection rates for the 20 second window and the remainder of the dataset do not differ to a large degree. However, being a non-static fault, the estimator does not converge to the faulty state, thus maintaining good detection characteristics for the duration of the fault. Maximum fault magnitude for this test was additive white noise with a standard deviation of less than two percent of the maximum sensor range, which also seems very good.
These tests were performed offline. To verify that this implementation works onboard during flight, tests were performed with the estimator running during flight. Detection results were streamed via wi-fi to a monitor for visual inspection. Results were comparable to the tests where the estimator was run on replayed data.
VI. Conclusion
As demonstrated, the fault detection algorithm described in Section II, coupled with the high-fidelity model described in Section IV is capable of detecting bias, drift, and increased noise of a non-redundant sensor real time in hardware. This is accomplished by establishing analytical redundancy using an accurate system model. Future work will include studying the effects of changing window sizes for each of the three tests and tuning the threshold for the thresholding test. A greater understanding of the fault detection capabilities could also be gained by increasing the levels of faults tested. In addition, the successful integration of information from the different tests to determine a level of confidence in declaring a fault should be examined. Finally, another area that deserves future work is the development of theoretical limits of performance for this method.
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